|
TERRORISM |
THE
CRISIS OF PAKISTAN: A DANGEROUSLY WEAK STATE
By
Dr.Isaac Kfir
This
paper explores several key elements undermining the viability of the Pakistani
state: Islamism, tribalism, ethno-nationalism, and quasi-secularism. The demands
of each of these movements are difficult to reconcile with the needs of the
others. At the same time, these movements exert pressure on a very weak
government and state system. Hence, the author argues that unless the current
regime undertakes substantial structural reforms, Pakistan may come apart at the
seams, with dire consequences for regional and international stability.
At the 60th Formation Commanders Conference in April 2007, President Pervez
Musharraf noted that domestic extremism, obscurantism, and religious bigotry
posed a greater threat to the Pakistani state than such threats from abroad.[1]
With much Islamist activity emanating from Pakistan, the United States has
deemed Pakistan as frontline state in the global “war on terror.” Thus the
country‟s political stability is imperative for success in this war.[2]
Yet the different elements within the country striving to establish dominance
and control have created instability.[3] Ultimately, a politically unstable
nuclear Pakistan threatens a highly volatile region in which there have been
changes in government and politics (Bangladesh[4] and Nepal[5]), increased
military spending (China[6]), questions over economic development and policy
direction (India[7]), and internal conflict brought about by rampant terrorist
and counterterrorist activity (Sri Lanka and Afghanistan).
The current political crisis in Pakistan revolves around a number of issues, all
of which begin and end with the question of whether or not Musharraf will remain
in power, as well as whether or not Pakistan will hold elections and if those
elections will indeed be just and fair.[8] Still, there is a feeling that
Musharraf must remain in office in order to counter the rising tide of radical
Islamism in the country. It is noteworthy that the other major Pakistani
political leaders, specifically Bhutto and Sharif, do not command the support of
the military to the extent that Musharraf does, which would make it difficult
for them to govern the country.[9] This paper focuses on the three key groups
and factors which pose a threat to the Pakistani state: Islamists, tribalists,
and ethno-nationalists. In addition, there is a fourth group, which emerged
following the suspension of Chief Justice Chaudhary. This group is composed of
the professional classes (quasi-secularists), who are angry at Musharraf‟s
manner and governance style, which they feel undermines Pakistan's move toward
democracy. To that extent, they may be labeled as the pro-democracy group.
Interestingly, in addition to members of the professional middle class, this
group is composed of Islamists who disliked Musharraf‟s attack on the
judiciary, which they view as the protector of Islam in Pakistan. They do not
address the role of the military directly, as the military does not pose a
direct threat to the viability of Pakistan. The military has traditionally
sought to protect the state of Pakistan, and to that end, it has often justified
its intervention in politics on the grounds that civilian rule undermines the
viability of Pakistan—civilian politicians cater to their own constituencies
and do not really appreciate the security situation.[10]
This paper focuses on the aforementioned groups, especially the first three,
because of their divergent views regarding the nature of Pakistan, which pose a
clear and immediate threat to Pakistan‟s survival as a homogenous state.
The tribalists and the ethno-nationalists seem to advocate either growing
autonomy or independence, while the Islamists want to strengthen Pakistan's
Islamic character. The article concludes that Pakistan is a weak state,
bordering on failure. The longer Pakistan remains in this vulnerable position,
the more powerful the Islamists will become. It is therefore essential that
Musharraf deal effectively with the Islamists, the provinces
(ethno-nationalists), the complaints of neglect (high levels of poverty), and
the lack of democracy. Without a major change, including Musharraf‟s
resignation (either from the military or from the political world), one of two
things could happen. First, the Islamist and the Islamist-leaning forces in
Pakistan could succeed in the 2007 and 2008 elections, especially as they are
already gathering momentum in the provinces. The second possibility is that
Musharraf will keep his uniform whilst retaining the office of President, which
would lead to mass demonstrations (worse than the Chaudhary protests). Both
scenarios would damage Pakistan‟s standing in the world, especially with
the United States, at a time when that country faces one of the most critical
elections in its history. Musharraf must understand that government and
governance are only legitimate if they meet the needs of the citizens, and it
increasingly appears that his government is failing to do so.
LEGITIMACY AND THE THREAT OF THE “WEAK STATE” SYNDROME
The term “weak state” differs from that of a “failed state” in that it
refers to a condition wherein the government has some level of authority. In a
“weak state” condition, the government is able to provide some of the basic
needs that a “failed state” cannot.[11] Thus, a “failed state” is one in
which the state is unable to protect its citizens from internal and external
threats. The term has also come to denote a central authority‟s
(government‟s) failure to provide basic services such as education and
healthcare to its people. The end of the Cold War, the triumph of
neo-liberalism, and the Bush Doctrine have placed government legitimacy at the
heart of the debate over state failure; that is, a government‟s ability to
protect and provide basic political and civil rights while operating under a
mandate given to it by the people.[12] Pakistan has yet to reach “failed
state” status, but there is little doubt that it is a weak state, teetering on
the precipice of being a “failed state.” The government in Islamabad has
little if any control over large sections of the country, especially Waziristan
and the North West Frontier Province, which is arguably why it signed various
peace agreements with the Waziri tribes in 2005-2006. The agreements, however,
achieved the exact opposite of what they were intended to, in that they did not
end terrorist activities; if anything, the regions are more dangerous, and
security comes not from the state but from the tribes.13 In the words of P.W.
Singer: Extremists tend to thrive in an environment where the state has
retreated and has no program for improvement. Their message gains traction and
appeal that it would otherwise not. A more moderate populace normally might not
be sympathetic to radical voices, but, at a loss in times of distress, will
listen to their message. Through offering free education and aid distributed
through clean schools, compared to the limited contact most have with sub-par
government institutions, the leaders of these organizations gain both a
receptive audience and evidence of their own superior credentials to lead.[14]
The situation of basic education and healthcare ranges from weak to nonexistent
in some parts of the country.[15] This state of affairs has assisted in the
process of Islamization as people turn to the private education system (madrassas)
to provide their children with education, and more importantly, food and
clothing. madrassas, which played a major role in providing willing fighters
during the Soviet-Afghan War, have continued to operate and arguably grow.
Singer notes that the allure of the madrassa is due to the poor quality of
Pakistani (state-provided) education (with teachers often on strike). Poor
parents send their children to Islamic schools so that they at least receive
some education. However, the major allure of the Islamic schools was and remains
the social services that they provide, as the children receive food and
clothing. Some madrassas have even paid parents to send their children to study
in these schools. Singer notes that Dar al-Ulum Haqqaniyya, with most of the
Afghani Taliban leadership members of its alumni, had 1,500 boarding students
and 1,000 day students aged six and up in 2001. Each year, Singer claims, the
school receives over 15,000 applicants from poor families vying for 400
available places.[16]
THE ISLAMISTS
The first group threatening the viability of the Pakistani state is the Muslim
radicals or fundamentalists, also known as Islamists. This group is on the rise.
These Muslims subscribe to a strict interpretation of Islam and work toward the
implementation of Shari‟a as the governing principle of their communities.
Commentators attribute the growth of Islamism to General Zia al-Haqq‟s
Islamization program, which led to a proliferation in the number of Islamist
movements (militant, educational, political, and social groups). This is best
illustrated with the Jamaati-Islami (the Islamic Association) that Zia—for a
short period—allowed into the government. Jamaati-Islami has continued to play
a part in Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy through its involvement in
Kashmir and Afghanistan. Since Zia, Islamists have remained in the political
system, which became most evident with the election of Fazlur Rehman as leader
of the opposition in Pakistan‟s parliament in 2004. Rehman is the leader
of Jammat-e-Ulema Islam, which reportedly has ties to the Taliban. More
recently, the government‟s inability to deal with the rise of Islamism in
Pakistan was manifest in its failure to deal with the students of Jamia Hafsa,
Jamia Fareedia and the Lal Masjid. Javed Iqbal Cheema, director general of the
National Crisis Management Cell, stated his opposition to using force against
these Islamists “because we are already confronting difficult situations in
Waziristan and Balochistan.” Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao based his
opposition to the use of force against the students because of the forthcoming
elections.[17]
Two sets of Islamists can be identified within Pakistan, though the distinction
has blurred with the rise of the Taliban movement. The first group consists of
Sunni Islamists who demand that Pakistan exist as a devout Sunni (Deobandi/Wahhabi)
Muslim state. When these Islamists first emerged on the scene, their focus was
on combating the Shi‟a presence and influence in the country. Such was the
case with Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, Army of the Friends of the Prophet),
formed by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the vice president of the Deobandi Jammat Ulema-e-Islam
(JUI) in 1985 in the city of Jhang, which has a large Shi‟a community.[18]
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and its offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)[19] subscribe
to the Deobandi School and reject the Barelvi School and Shi‟a
interpretation, which they hold as deviations from pure Islam and thus campaign
to have Shi‟as declared as non-Muslims.[20]The SSP, which also operates
under the name of Millet-e-Islami, the largest sectarian organization in
Pakistan, plays a role in the political arena through electioneering. SSP
leaders have won seats in the Pakistan National Assembly (for example, Azzam
Tariq served four terms). The group draws most of its strength from the Punjab
province and from the city of Karachi. The SSP holds that the Shi‟a are
non-Muslims who have acquired far too much power in Pakistan. The organization
boasts 500 offices and branches in all 34 districts of Punjab, with around
100,000 registered workers in Pakistan as well as 17 branches in foreign
countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada,
and the United Kingdom. Of growing concern is the ability of these movements,
especially the SSP and the LeJ, to resurface and to continue to operate in
Pakistan despite their prohibition.[21] A second group of Islamists focuses on
the imposition of Shari‟a and the formation of the Caliphate. For such
Islamists, who operate as part of the global jihadist movement, Pakistan must
exist as an Islamic state (a theocracy). This may explain the proliferation of
religious parties in Pakistan. Reportedly, there are some 245 religious parties
in Pakistan, of which 215 have their own seminaries, 104 focus on jihad, 82 are
sectarian, 20 are oriented toward tabligh (preaching), and 28 take part in the
political process.[22] Islamic radicalism and violence is not restricted to the
pursuit of the caliphate or the establishment of Pakistan as a Sunni state. The
debate over Pakistan's religious direction has also meant that it has had to
grapple with intense sectarian violence, as the Shi‟a in Pakistan have
their own groups. These include Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP, Movement of the
Followers of Fiqah-e-Jaferia) and Sipah-e-Muhamad (SMP, Army of Muhammad). These
groups battle Sunni-based movements. Their aim is to protect Shi‟a
interests in Pakistan, and to this end, these groups rely on support from
Iran.[23] The existence of these groups, provide an explanation for heightened
sectarian tensions in the country [24] as well for the following statement by
the International Crisis Group: For almost two decades, the Northern Areas have
been afflicted by sectarianism; in recent years Shia-Sunni violence has
increased markedly. In 2005 alone, almost 100 people died, many more were
injured, and property worth millions of rupees was destroyed. Even more harmful
was the long-term damage to social harmony.[25]
Pakistan‟s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) have acquired a
reputation for promoting Taliban-like Islamism, as well as being one of the
possible hiding places of Usama bin Ladin and leading al-Qa‟ida members.
Thus, in 2001, in a desire to confront the rising tide of Islamism and to
appease Washington,[26] President Musharraf dispatched more than 80,000 troops
to battle Taliban and tribal leaders who had taken control of these areas and
were providing shelter to bin Ladin. The ferocity of the fighting extracted a
heavy price from the Pakistani state, with hundreds of soldiers killed. More
importantly though, due to the tactics used by the military, many local tribes
were alienated and angered, causing immense damage to the campaign to eradicate
Islamic radicalism in the region. Put simply, instead of quelling the
anti-government feeling in the FATAs and the other unruly provinces, two things
happened. First, the government failed to quell the insurgency, which has grown
since the dispatch of the troops to the provinces. Second, the insurgency
allowed the Islamists to continue to operate and show that they are stronger
than the government, as they government failed to defeat them. Over time, the
tribally based Islamists have become more brazen in their demands and their
opposition to the regime,[27] as they sense Musharraf's weakness. The most
recent example of the move of Islamism from the provinces to the center was when
students from the Jamia Hafsa madrassa in Islamabad took over the Lal Masjid
(Red Mosque, of which it is a part), leading to a long standoff between the
Islamists and the government. The crisis began when the students demanded that
the authorities release two of the school‟s female teachers and six other
detainees involved in an attempt to shut down a brothel.[28] The significance of
the Jamia Hafsa madrassa is that it caters largely to girls (reportedly it has
around 2,000 female students) who, despite being taught geography and math,
focus mainly on Islamic teachings. This commitment to Islam is best seen in a
comment made by Vice Principal Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who when asked about the
limited curriculum stated: “Islam is enough. It is a complete code for modern
life.” This is a message that the students are very keen to promote, as noted
by Gul Shaida, a student of the Jamia Hafsa madrassa who declared,“After I
graduate I want to teach all over the world and I want to tell the world what is
Islam and what is Muslim.”[29]
TRIBALISM
The second force threatening Musharraf and the state of Pakistan is the
continuous bloodshed in the tribal/frontier areas.[30] Musharraf‟s
controversial deal with the Waziri tribes in September 2006 did not end the
troubles in Waziristan (North and South), forcing the government to impose
curfews and dispatch troops.[31] Still, the fighting has continued, with
hundreds dying in the clashes between security forces and Taliban elements. Of
greater concern for the government is the role played by non-Pakistani forces in
the region, with most of the foreign fighters coming from Chechnya and
Uzbekistan, though there have also been rumors of militants from Morocco and
Algeria supporting the Chechens and Uzbeks.[32] Interestingly, tribal leaders
claim that those responsible for the clashes with the security forces are not
locals but foreigners. This is particularly so regarding the Uzbeks, whom the
local Pashtuns accepted as visitors following the American invasion of
Afghanistan. In one instance, local tribesmen came across a camp used by the
Uzbeks, which held around 200 local tribesmen in underground dungeons (holes in
the ground). The Uzbeks poured hot water on the prisoners.[33] These Uzbeki
Islamists have attracted considerable animosity from the locals, who have come
to see them as interlopers and common criminals. This view is shared by
Pakistani military commanders who claim that during raids on Uzbek hideouts in
spring 2005 they obtained evidence that the Uzbeks were eating pork and watching
pornography.[34] Pakistani government officials appear to support the tribes
that claim to be fighting the foreigners and expelling them from the region,
which gives credence to the controversial peace plan that the government signed
with the tribes in September 2006.[35] In April 2007, council of tribal elders
was summoned in South Waziristan, with the tribal elders calling for the setting
up of a lashkar (militia) to engage the Uzbeks who are in the province in a
jihad. Local traditions dictate that any man of fighting age who does not join
the lashkar will be fined and his house burnt down.[36 ]The government has
hailed this as a great achievement and as an example of its triumph over the
tribal leaders who are sympathetic of the Uzbek fighters, many of whom are
affiliated with either the Taliban or radical Islam. The problem, however, is
that it is unclear whether the tribes are fighting all the foreign fighters or
merely the troublesome Uzbeks. In addition, the central government hardly
exercises any control over the areas, which have been used by high-ranking
officials such as Mullah Dadullah, a leading Taliban figure in Afghanistan, in
their campaigns in Afghanistan.[37]
ETHNO-NATIONALISM
The third group undermining the viability of the Pakistani state is composed
of the ethno-nationalists. They operate across the country but are most visible
in the province of Balochistan, where, on March 27, 2007, for example, militants
destroyed a power pylon station cutting off electricity to millions. The attack
was symptomatic of the type of insurgency active in Balochistan since 2002, in
which Baloch nationalists have focused more on infrastructure targets such as
the Sui gas plants and the bridge near Kari-Dor. These attacks affect the
province‟s economy as well as that of Pakistan. Pakistan‟s economic
development is heavily reliant on Balochistan due to the province‟s vast
gas reserves and strategic location (it bridges Central, South, Southeast, and
East Asia on one side and Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East on
the other). The province also hosts a deep-sea port built with the help of
China, which highlights the close relationship between China and Pakistan.
Ironically, Islamabad seems to be doing what it can to further alienate the
Balochs, who then turn to ethno-nationalism and, more worryingly, to the Taliban,
as they fight the government.[38] That is, the nationalists (Nawab Khair Baksh,
Nawab Bugti, and Nawab Baksh) see the projects initiated by Islamabad as being
part of a plan to subjugate Balochistan.[39] Balochistan has a history of
Islamism. During the Afghan jihad, the Pakistani government used the close
proximity of the province to establish madrassas that encouraged young men to
head to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation (In 1950 there were seven
madrassas. By 2003, the number stood at over 1,000). Consequently, there are
several tensions in the provinces, stemming from sectarianism (Sunni versus
Shi‟a—the province borders Iran), a large Afghan refugee community, and
unhappy ethnic Balochs who are angry with what is happening to their
province.[40] Another cause for Baloch discontentment with the government arises
from the strong-arm tactics adopted by the Musharraf government to quell the
insurgency, as seen with the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August
2006.[41] His death raised the stakes due to the respect that many had toward
Bugti, but it also emphasized Islamabad‟s concern with the rising tide of
Baloch nationalism.
THE LEGAL CRISIS
The short suspension of Chief Justice Chaudhary by President Musharraf on
charges of nepotism and corruption was a major threat to Musharraf‟s rule.
Chaudhary has since returned to the bench, as the charges against him were not
prove, and under him the Court has continued to rule against the government
which such rulings as the one permitting the return of former Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to Pakistan. He has also ordered the suspension of inspector
general, Syed Marwat Ali Shah and two other senior police officers after the way
the police dealt with journalist and lawyers demonstrating against the Supreme
Court and Election Commission rulings that allowed Musharraf to campaign for the
presidency without relinquish his army position. These rulings have made life
very difficult for Musharraf and the government whilst also intensifying
tensions within Pakistan. The Chaudhary legal crisis intensified the debate over
constitutionalism, democracy, and the role of the military in Pakistan while
uniting various factions that traditionally oppose one another (lawyers, members
of the secular Pakistan Peoples‟ Party, and Islamists)[42] against
Musharraf‟s perceived authoritarianism. Put simply, for over a year now,
and especially since the return of Chaudhary to the bench, the executive and the
judicial branches have been at log-heads, which has divided the country between
those who support the Court and those who support Musharraf. The key Court
supporters are the lawyers and some members of the professional classes, as well
as the Islamic parties who draw their support from the lower classes of
Pakistani society. Imran Khan, the leader of the Pakistan Movement for Justice
and a member of the Pakistani parliament has declared: It has become obvious to
every Pakistani that, far from presiding over a transition to genuine democracy
in the country, Musharraf is intent on dismantling every democratic institution
in his way. Over recent months he has assaulted the judiciary, restricted
freedom of the press, and put hundreds of members of the opposition behind
bars.[43]
Critics claim that Musharraf turned against Chaudhary because as chief justice
Chaudhary had ruled against the government on a number of cases. For example,
Chaudhary had reversed the sale of state-owned Pakistan Steel Mills, and more
importantly, he had demanded that the security agencies disclose the location of
missing persons whom the security services denied having detained. In addition,
Musharraf‟s opponents claim that Chaudhary‟s suspension was
political, as Musharraf saw Chaudhary as a possible threat if he were to
continue to serve as president and chief of the army, in violation of the
constitution. It is noteworthy that the Court and its justices are generally
respected in Pakistan and may explain why Wajih al-Din Ahmad, a former Supreme
Court justice, has decided to run for the presidency. Musharraf therefore opted
to suspend the chief justice and asked the judicial council, whose composition
also raised eyebrows, to examine Chaudhary‟s alleged abuse of power.[44]
Throughout the suspension period, Pakistan endured numerous demonstrations which
posed a major threat to Musharraf‟s rule: They united Pakistani liberals
with pro-Taliban and Islamist elements, which both demanded Chaudhary‟s
restoration to the bench.[45] Moreover, by choosing to engage in street
demonstrations, the protesters emphasized their willingness to challenge
Musharraf‟s authority and that of the army, as Musharraf is the head of
the army as well. There is no doubt that there has been an overreaction on the
side of the security forces in dealing with the protests; at one point, a
private media outlet (Geo) was shut down and Kamran Khan was taken off the air.
The event proved so damaging and embarrassing to Musharraf that he issued an
apology.[46]
FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Pakistan and the United States
Musharraf‟s decision to support the global “war on terror” led
Pakistan to play an active role in assisting the United States to defeat al-Qa‟ida
and the Taliban. In other words, not only is Pakistan helping to destroy the
monster that it assisted in creating, but it is supporting non-Muslims.
Internally, this has placed Musharraf in a difficult position, as the United
States is rarely loved or appreciated in the Muslim world, including in
Pakistan. There is a growing sense that America under President Bush is engaged
in a “crusade” against the Muslim world. Musharraf, because of his close
association with Bush and the United States, has faced accusations of being
America's lackey and of supporting the killing of true Muslims. Thus, following
the storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad by Pakistani troops, Liaquat Baluch,
the leader of Muttehida Majlis Amal stated: “Musharraf has launched the
operation to please America.... He [Musharraf] is now become [sic] a threat to
national security and has to be removed.”[47] Soon after the end of the Red
Mosque saga, Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Ladin‟s second in command, declared in
a video recording produced by al-Qa‟ida‟s al-Sahan media unit: This
crime can only be washed by repentance or blood.... If you do not retaliate...
Musharraf will not spare any of you…. Your salvation is only through jihad.
You must now back the mujahideen in Afghanistan.[48]
Washington has expressed some unhappiness with the current state of affairs in
Pakistan. It feels let down, as despite giving billions of dollars in aid and
support to Pakistan, the situation with the Taliban and the al-Qa‟ida
problem along the Afghan-Pakistan border has remained the same.[49] A five-page
report by U.S. counterterrorism analysts entitled “Al-Qa‟ida Better
Positioned to Strike the West” states that al-Qa‟ida has used the
Afghan-Pakistan border to restore its capabilities to a level unseen since the
months before September 11. A counterterrorism expert involved in the report
said that al-Qa‟ida is able to plan attacks in Europe and the United
States because there is no effective opposition to its operations along the
Afghan-Pakistan border. John Kringen, the head of the CIA's analysis
directorate, supports this claim, saying: “They [al-Qa‟ida] seem to be
fairly well settled into the safe haven and the ungoverned spaces of
Pakistan…. We see more training. We see more money. We see more
communications. We see that activity rising.”[50] Such comments clearly affect
Pakistan‟s and Musharraf‟s standing in Washington and may explain
Musharraf‟s outburst on U.S. television in April 2007, in which he
claimed, in response to a question on the security issue, that “Pakistan is
being maligned by the West... unfairly.”[51] The willingness by American
policymakers to criticize Pakistan and Musharraf has led to a reevaluation of
Pakistan and Musharraf‟s position in South Asia, especially with the
improvement in U.S.-Indian relations. This development, coupled with
India‟s growing economy and burgeoning military capability,[52] plays into
the hands of the Pakistani military,which regards itself as the guardian of the
Pakistani state.[53] In other words, losing U.S. support may push the military
to adopt a stronger Islamic stance, which is traditionally what the military had
done when it has felt that its position within Pakistan was being undermined.
This is because the military knows that Islamists will always support a strong
stance against India and the West.
Pakistan and Afghanistan
The second foreign policy threat arises from the poor relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan and is linked to the poor relations between President
Hamid Karzai and President Musharraf. Karzai, following an increase in suicide
terrorism in Afghanistan, claimed that Pakistani security services were not
doing enough to stem the flow of suicide terrorists from Pakistan to
Afghanistan. In an interview, Karzai stated: “We [Afghanistan] have almost
daily reports of suicide bombers coming from there [Pakistan]…. If we have
better co-operation from Pakistan, a great many of these cross-border crossings
would stop.” More worrying is his accusation that Pakistani security forces
are sheltering Mullah Omar in Quetta, Balochistan.[54] This claim emphasizes the
poor relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which only strengthens al-Qa‟ida
and the Taliban.[55] Significantly, as the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan remains porous, the Taliban and Islamists are able to continue their
policy of intimidation and terror.
CONCLUSION
The situation in Pakistan is becoming increasingly dire, as tensions within the
country rise while the government appears helpless to control events. In many
ways, the government is playing catch-up as it tries to put out fires (often
started by the government). This seriously undermines the viability of the
Pakistani state. The government‟s decision to sign a peace agreement with
the Waziri tribes has brought a mixed result: It has placed law and order in the
hands of tribal leaders who seem to have the potential to engage the rising
influence of the Taliban in their regions. However, the agreement emphasized
that the Pakistani government does not control the tribal regions, even with
substantial troop deployment. Ultimately, the peace agreement allowed al-Qa‟ida
to rebuild its capabilities,[56] while real power in these areas remains with
the tribal council, which weakens the state and thus does not enhance security
and stability either internally or externally. On a more positive note,
Musharraf has brought about economic growth in the country, a remarkable
achievement. The growth stems from the introduction of much needed structural
reforms which reduced the size of the civil service and led to a decline in
subsidies on energy prices and a clean-up of the balance sheets of nationalized
banks. The government has raised tax revenues and accelerated a privatization
process.[57] Moreover, there has also been substantial improvement in the realm
of exports, with the value rising from $5.5 billion in 2002 to $14.5 billion by
2006, with non-textile exports registering a growth of 37.5 percent, compared to
textile export growth which only increased by 6.6 percent for the same
period.[58] However, despite all the changes, poverty has remained a major issue
in Pakistan and the country still relies on food aid, which emphasizes that
there is still tremendous work to be done.
There is little doubt that as the U.S. presidential race heats up, presidential
candidates will focus more on Pakistan, as it is a key ally in the “war on
terror.” This means that Pakistan will be called upon to embrace many reforms,
with political reforms being at the top of the list (such as allowing the return
of Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif as a sign of democratic progress).[59] This could
cause a backlash that would shore up the Islamists and others (such as
high-ranking military officials), who would use such calls to claim American
arrogance and interference, as seen in the reaction to U.S. Senator Barack
Obama's suggestion that the United States may attack terrorist targets within
Pakistan without acquiring Pakistan's permission. It is noteworthy that there is
a tradition of anti-Americanism in Pakistan, as seen in the 2002 elections, when
Islamists in NWFP built on anti-American sentiments to gather support. Thus, one
must issue two notes of caution in relation to the growing demands for
democratization in Pakistan. First, there is a danger in pushing Musharraf too
far, as it may compel him to continue the military‟s traditional
relationship with Islamist parties, ensuring his survivability in Pakistani
politics.[60] Second, it is clear that Musharraf is desperate to remain in
power, which may explain why Benazir Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan‟s most
popular political party (Pakistan‟s People‟s Party), allegedly held
secret negotiations with Musharraf‟s allies.[61] However, pinning hopes on
Bhutto and Sharif negates their tainted pasts (both have been accused of
corruption) and their own failures when they were office. One must also question
their ability of reigning in the ever-powerful military.
The hope for a stable Pakistan still rests with Musharraf, so long as he
replaces his uniform with a suit and tie. This means negotiating some sort of a
deal with Pakistan's civil politicians and agreeing to end many of the excesses
of the Pakistani security services, such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances,
and extrajudicial killings. Ultimately, Musharraf must use his influence over
the military to encourage it, as well as the other security forces, to remain
outside the political world. The military must realize that in the twenty-first
century, it can no longer continue to dominate the Pakistani political system.
The benefit of this would be that Pakistani politicians would be able to govern
without worrying about military intervention, and the power of the Islamists who
clearly rely on the military for support would thus be reduced. Thus, what is
abundantly clear when looking at Pakistan and its history is that the country is
dangerously weak because it has to contend with tremendous poverty as well as
with religious, ethnic, cultural, and generational tensions. This means that the
challenge faced by Musharraf, or anyone that succeeds him is to bridge all these
gaps and issues. The best way to achieve this is through the enhancement of
democracy and economic growth in Pakistan and ending the paranoia of an Indian
takeover. Musharraf, as someone who grew up in Turkey, should model himself
after Kemal Ataturk, a stronger leader who embraced secularism in a Muslim
country while promoting economic and social development. By following the
Ataturk model, Musharraf could save Pakistan and help the world deal with the
Islamist scourge.
NOTES
[1]Aziz Malik, “Pakistan Fighting Terrorism in its Own Interest, Says
Musharraf,” Pakistan Times, April 17, 2007, http://www.pakistantimes.net/2007/04/17/top2.htm.
[2] The former director of the National Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of
State John Negroponte declared in January 2007, “Pakistan is a frontline
partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic
extremism and the home for some top terrorist leaders.” John D. Negroponte,
“Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,”
Unclassified Statement for the Record Annual Threat Assessment Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte,
January 11, 2007, http://intelligence.senate.gov/070111/negroponte.pdf.
[3] On the inherent tensions and problems of Pakistan, see Stephen P. Cohen, The
Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004) and Stephen
P. Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 109-22.
[4] At the beginning of 2007, the Bangladeshi military declared a state of
emergency and installed a caretaker government. The military also suspended
elections on the grounds of rising corruption. Since then, there have been mass
arrests, demonstrations, and a natural disaster.
[5] In 2006, Nepal's Maoist guerrillas agreed to join an interim government
after ten years of fighting the political establishment. The Maoists, under the
leadership of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, are seeking to bring about change in Nepal
through the ballot box.
[6] Jonathan Watts, “Asian Arms Race Fear as Beijing Raises Spending,” The
Guardian, March 5, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,2026729,00.html.
[7] Jo Johnson, “India Lifts Freeze on Enterprise Zones,” Financial Times,
April 6, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c45ad352-e408-11db-bf06-000b5df10621.html.
[8] Pakistan is scheduled to host parliamentary elections in 2007, followed by
presidential elections in 2008. Under the Pakistani Constitution, the provincial
and federal parliaments elect the President. Bhutto and Sharif were prevented
from campaigning in the 2002 elections.
[9] It is noteworthy that the Taliban and Islamism grew under Bhutto and Sharif.
Therefore, putting them in charge does not automatically mean an end to Islamic
militancy. Moreover, Bhutto and Sharif quickly realized that their power was
limited; for example, they were prevented from having a serious voice on
military and security matters.
[10] To justify the 1999 coup, Musharraf claimed that he and the army removed
Sharif because the civilian authority was not fulfilling its role in protecting
Pakistan. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon &
Schuster, 2006).
[11] For a greater discussion of the characteristics of a “failed state,”
see Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
[12] This notion arises from John Lock‟s Two Treatises of Government in
which he argues for the existence of a contract between the monarch and the
subjects. According to the contact theory, people grant the monarch the right to
rule and the monarch agrees to do so, honestly and justly. John Locke, Two
Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the
triumph on liberal democracy, see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”
The National Interest (Summer 1989) and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and
the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
[13] Between January 2007 and September 2007, 536 civilians, 241 security forces
personnel, and 687 insurgents/terrorists died (total 1,464). In 2006, 608
civilians, 325 military personnel, and 538 terrorists died (total 1,471). In
2005, the fatality list was 430 civilians, 81 securitypersonnel, and 137
terrorists (total 648). “Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Pakistan,”
South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm
(accessed June 27, 2007).
[14] P.W. Singer, “Pakistan‟s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education
not Jihad,” Brookings Institute Analysis Paper No. 14 (November 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/singer/20020103.pdf.
[15] It is weakest in the places where the government has little control, which
significantly are areas where the Islamists are strongest.
[16] Singer, “Pakistan‟s Madrassahs.”
[17] "Intelligence Agencies Oppose Lal Masjid Crackdown," Daily Times
(Pakistan), April 11, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007411story_11-4-2007_pg1_2.
[18] “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,” Asia Report No. 95
(Islamabad/Brussels: April 18, 2005), International Crisis Group, p. 14.
[19] Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori, and Malik Ishaque set up LeJ, possibly because
they became disillusioned with the SSP following the assassination of Maulana
Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the SSP founder. An alternative explanation for the formation
of the LeJ was a desire to protect the political leadership of the SSP from
Shi‟a attacks that claimed SSP leaders such as Israr al-Haq Qasmi and Zia
al-Rahman Farooqi. Initially, LeJ focused on the Shi‟a in Pakistan and
Iran, but with the fall of the Taliban—an ally of LeJ—the organization
shifted its attention to Western and American targets. LeJ has forged ties with
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. According to Pakistani security forces, LeJ
operates through small cells of a maximum of seven people. Animesh Roul,
“Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International
Terrorism,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 11 (June 2, 2005), pp. 6-8.
[20] “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,” pp. 3-4 and throughout.
[21] Amir Rana, "Vengeance, Frictions Reviving LJ and Sipah-e-Muhammad,"
Daily Times (Pakistan), April 7, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-4-2004_pg7_28;
“The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan;” Roul, “Sipah-Sahaba;” and
“Pakistan's Militant Islamic Groups,” BBC News On-Line, October 7, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3170970.stm.
[22] The founder of JI, Abul A'ala Maududi, not only backed General Zia when he
overthrew Bhutto in the 1970s but later also supported the jihad in Afghanistan.
“Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan,” Asia Report No.
102 (Islamabad/Brussels: September 28, 2005), International Crisis Group, p. 13.
The figures are taken from Hassan Abbas, "Pakistan Through the Lens of the
„Triple A‟ Theory," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 30,
No. 1 (Winter 2006), p. 185. He uses figures provided by Amir Rana, a Pakistani
journalist.
[23] “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan” and Veena Kurkreja,
Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises (London: New Sage
Publications, 2003).
[24] According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in January-February 2007,
Pakistan experienced three known sectarian incidents that left five people dead
and 21 people injured. In 2006, there were 38 incidents, in which 201 people
died and 349 people were injured. “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: 2007,”
South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm,
accessed on April 5, 2007.
[25] “Discord in Pakistan‟s Northern Areas,” Asia Report No. 131
(Islamabad/Brussels: April 2, 2007), International Crisis Group, p. 1 and
“Pakistan: Karachi‟s Madrasas and Violent Extremism,” Asia Report No.
130 (Islamabad/Brussels: March 27, 2007), International Crisis Group.
[26] Musharraf has declared: “It was in our national interest because I knew
what would happen now in Afghanistan…Our diplomatic association with the
Taliban was going to become meaningless, as obviously they were going to be
sorted out." Quotation taken from Peter Taylor, “The Crucible,” The
Guardian, August 8, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,1544709,00.html.
[27] Jeremy Page, “Sharia Gangs Roam Streets of Capital City to Enforce their
Law with Threats,” The Times, April 6, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1620554.ece.
[28] “Madrassa Pupils Abduct „Brothel Owner,‟ Cops,” Gulf Times
(Qatar), March 29, 2007, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=140753&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23.
[29] Jannat Jalil, "Pakistan's Islamic Girl Schools," BBC News
On-Line, September 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4258224.stm.
[30] Akhtar Amin, "Rs 5,000 Fine for „Un-Islamic‟ Activities,"
Daily Times (Pakistan), April 5, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=200745story_5-4-2007_pg7_7
and Ali Waqar, "Islamists Enforce Prayer Breaks at PU Hostel Shops,"
Daily Times (Pakistan), April 5, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=200745story_5-4-2007_pg13_1.
[31] See for example, “Border Town Under Curfew After Clashes with Taliban,”
Gulf Times (Qatar), March 29, 2007, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=140762&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23.
[32] “Tribal Offensive Could Curb Rebel Attacks: Officials,” Gulf Times
(Qatar), April 1, 2007, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=141214&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23.
[33] “Uzbeks Outstay Pashtun Welcome,” AlJazerra.net, March 28, 2007,
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A8391A95-17DC-497E-84C4-4EDA05B28931.htm.
[34] Declan Walsh, "Toll Hits 250 as Pakistani Tribesmen Fight to Expel
Foreign Militants," The Guardian, April 5, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,,2050223,00.html.
[35] “Tribesmen Attack Qaeda Bunkers,” Daily Times (Pakistan), April 1,
2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=200741story_1-4-2007_pg1_3.
[36] Jeremy Page, "Army Breathes a Sigh of Relief as Militant Groups Turn
on Each Other in Spring Thaw," The Times, April 11, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1637170.ece.
[37] M. Ilyas Khan, “Fractious Militants United by One Thing,” BBC News
On-Line, March 7, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6423903.stm.
[38] Tarique Niazi, “The Geostrategic Implications of the Baloch
Insurgency,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 22 (November 16, 2006), pp. 8-11.
[39] Zaffar Abbas, “Pakistan's Battle over Balochistan,” BBC News On-Line,
August
26, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5289910.stm.
[40] Figures taken from “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,” p. 20.
[41] In March 2007, Pakistani security forces arrested a senior militant
commander of the banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). “Rebels Bomb Power
Pylon in Baluchistan,” Gulf Times (Qatar), March 29, 2007, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=140764&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23.
[42] “Pakistan Judge Protests Escalates,” BBC News On-Line, April 13, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6551143.stm.
[43] Imran Khan, “The Rules Change When Dictators Serve US Interests,” The
Guardian, July 11, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,,2123283,00.html.
Isaac Kfir
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2007) 87
[44] M. Ilyas Khan, “Judge Row Prompts Pakistan Democracy Questions,” BBC
News On-Line, March 12, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6442829.stm
and “Sacked Judge Insists Judiciary Must Be Free,” Gulf Times (Qatar), March
29, 2007, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=140754&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23.
[45] Declan Walsh, “Anti-Musharraf Protesters Rally Outside Court to Defend
Judge,” The Guardian, April 4, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,,2049414,00.html.
[46] Masud Alam, “Blood and Batons Spur Pakistan Row,” BBC News On-Line,
March 17, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6462745.stm.
[47] Quotation taken from Zahid Hussain, “Crossfire Kills Mosque Leader Who
Wanted Martyrdom and Revolution,” The Times, July 11, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2056532.ece.
[48] Cited in Declan Walsh, “73 Bodies Recovered at End of Mosque Siege,”
The Guardian, July 12, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,,2124222,00.html.
[49] Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When $10 Billon is not Enough:
Rethinking U.S. Strategy towards Pakistan." The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
30, No. 3 (Spring 2007), pp. 7-19.
[50] Matthew Lee and Katherine Shrader, “Al-Qaeda Has Rebuilt, U.S. Intel
Warns,” Associated Press, July 12, 2007, http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_TERROR_THREAT?SITE=CAVEN&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT.
[51] “Musharraf „Very Angry‟ with Karzai over Security,” Gulf Times
(Qatar), April 15, 2007, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=143749&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23.
[52] Rajat Pandit, “China Hikes Arms Budget to $44 Billion,” The Times of
India (India), March 5, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS/India/China_hikes_arms_budget_to_44_bn/articleshow/1726841.cms.
[53] Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, p. 93 and throughout. Frederic Grare has gone
so far as to state: “The Pakistani military is the main source of insecurity
on the subcontinent….” Frederic Grare, “Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist
Peril,” Policy Brief No. 45 (February 2006), Carnegie Endowment for Peace, p.
2.
[54] “Pakistan 'Harbouring Mullah Omar,'” The Australian, April 2, 2007,
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21488277-38197,00.html.
[55] Lee and Shrader, “Al-Qaeda Has Rebuilt.”
[56] Ibid.
[57] The Economist, March 20, 2003. For a more up-to-date report on the
Pakistani economy, see “Pakistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,”
IMF Country Report No. 05/408 (International Monetary Fund: November 2005),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05408.pdf.
[58] John Wall, country director at the World Bank, has claimed that if Pakistan
could maintain its current growth for the next 10 to15 years “…it would
become another Asian tiger.” “Pakistan 2006: A Resilient Economy,” Global
Agenda (London: World Link Publication Ltd., 2006), pp. 6, 8, http://www.globalagendamagazine.com/pdfs/2006/Pakistan.pdf#search='pakistan%27s%20economy'.
[59] U.S. Senator Joseph Biden, the chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and a presidential candidate, has written to Musharraf to encourage
him to allow the return of Bhutto and Sharif to emphasize the democratic
development in Pakistan. Somini Sengupta with Carlotta Gall, “As Musharraf‟s
Woes Grow, Enter an Old Rival, Again.” New York Times, April 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/world/asia/06benazir.html?ref=asia.
[60] In 2002 Musharraf sought and won support from the Muttehida Majlis Amal (an
Islamic political movement), thus helping him remain in office.
[61] Reportedly, Lieutenant General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani, the head of the ISI,
and Lieutenant General Hamid Javaid, Musharraf's chief of staff, held talks with
Sharif in London. Zahid Hussain, “Bhutto Free to Return After Graft Charges
Are Dropped,” The Times, April 6, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1620360.ece
and Salman Masood, "Close Aides to Musharraf Meet with His
Opposition," New York Times, August
27, 2007.